

The Dynamics of Economic Growth

esid
identifying routes to social justice

A Visual Handbook of Growth Rates, Regimes, Transitions and Volatility

The Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID)

The Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) is a network of researchers and policy partners in Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, the UK, the USA and other countries. ESID researchers are working together to investigate what kinds of politics help to secure inclusive development and how these can be promoted. ESID is funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and is led from the School of Environment and Development and the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, UK.

ESID partners include the Institute for Economic Growth, India, BRAC Development Institute, Bangladesh, University of Malawi, Centre for Democratic Development, Ghana, University of Cape Town, South Africa and the Centre for International Development at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA, as well as research associates in Rwanda, the UK and elsewhere.

ESID research will investigate the political drivers of inclusive development, particularly how state capacity and elite commitment can emerge and be sustained and how to support these processes. There will be a central focus on the role of power relations and dominant ideas in shaping developmental forms of state capacity and elite commitment.

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The Dynamics of Economic Growth: A Visual Handbook of Growth Rates, Regimes, Transitions and Volatility

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The Dynamics of Economic Growth: A Visual Handbook of Growth Rates, Regimes, Transitions and Volatility

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List of Symbols and Abbreviations

Abbreviations

BP	Bai-Perron
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
PWT	Penn World Tables
GDPPC	Gross Domestic Product Per Capita
MA	Moving Average
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
ppa	Percent per annum
PWT	Penn World Tables
SD	Standard Deviation

Symbols

Ln	Natural Log
g	Average Annual Growth Rate
R^2	Co-Efficient of Determination
SD	Standard Deviation
Δg	Change in Growth Rate

List of Country Codes

Country	Code
Afghanistan	**AFG**
Albania	**ALB**
Algeria	**DZA**
Angola	**AGO**
Argentina	**ARG**
Australia	**AUS**
Austria	**AUT**
Bangladesh	**BGD**
Belgium	**BEL**
Benin	**BEN**
Bolivia	**BOL**
Botswana	**BWA**
Brazil	**BRA**
Bulgaria	**BGR**
Burkina Faso	**BFA**
Burundi	**BDI**
Cambodia	**KHM**
Cameroon	**CMR**
Canada	**CAN**
Central African Republic	**CAF**

Country	Code
Chad	**TCD**
Chile	**CHL**
China	**CHN**
Colombia	**COL**
Congo, Rep.	**COG**
Congo, Dem Rep.	**ZAR**
Costa Rica	**CRI**
Côte d'Ivoire	**CIV**
Cuba	**CUB**
Cyprus	**CYP**
Denmark	**DNK**
Dominican Republic	**DOM**
Ecuador	**ECU**
Egypt, Arab Rep.	**EGY**
El Salvador	**SLV**
Ethiopia	**ETH**
Fiji	**FJI**
Finland	**FIN**
France	**FRA**
Gabon	**GAB**

Country	Code
Gambia, The	**GMB**
Germany	**DEU**
Ghana	**GHA**
Greece	**GRC**
Guatemala	**GTM**
Guinea	**GIN**
Guinea-Bissau	**GNB**
Guyana	**GUY**
Haiti	**HTI**
Honduras	**HND**
Hong Kong SAR, China	**HKG**
Hungary	**HUN**
India	**IND**
Indonesia	**IDN**
Iran, Islamic Rep.	**IRN**
Iraq	**IRQ**
Ireland	**IRL**
Israel	**ISR**
Italy	**ITA**
Jamaica	**JAM**

Country	Code
Japan	**JPN**
Jordan	**JOR**
Kenya	**KEN**
Korea, Rep.	**KOR**
Lao PDR	**LAO**
Lebanon	**LBN**
Lesotho	**LSO**
Liberia	**LBR**
Madagascar	**MDG**
Malawi	**MWI**
Malaysia	**MYS**
Mali	**MLI**
Mauritania	**MRT**
Mauritius	**MUS**
Mexico	**MEX**
Mongolia	**MNG**
Morocco	**MAR**
Mozambique	**MOZ**
Namibia	**NAM**
Nepal	**NPL**
Netherlands	**NLD**
New Zealand	**NZL**

Country	Code
Nicaragua	**NIC**
Niger	**NER**
Nigeria	**NGA**
Norway	**NOR**
Oman	**OMN**
Pakistan	**PAK**
Panama	**PAN**
Papua New Guinea	**PNG**
Paraguay	**PRY**
Peru	**PER**
Philippines	**PHL**
Poland	**POL**
Portugal	**PRT**
Puerto Rico	**PRI**
Romania	**ROM**
Rwanda	**RWA**
Senegal	**SEN**
Sierra Leone	**SLE**
Singapore	**SGP**
Somalia	**SOM**
South Africa	**ZAF**
Spain	**ESP**

Country	Code
Sri Lanka	**LKA**
Sudan	**SDN**
Swaziland	**SWZ**
Sweden	**SWE**
Switzerland	**CHE**
Syrian Arab Republic	**SYR**
Taiwan	**TWN**
Tanzania	**TZA**
Thailand	**THA**
Togo	**TGO**
Trinidad and Tobago	**TTO**
Tunisia	**TUN**
Turkey	**TUR**
Uganda	**UGA**
United Kingdom	**GBR**
United States	**USA**
Uruguay	**URY**
Venezuela, RB	**VEN**
Vietnam	**VNM**
Zambia	**ZMB**
Zimbabwe	**ZWE**

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Abstract

Why there are such significant and persistent differences in living standards across countries is one of the most important and challenging areas of development policy. In spite of a voluminous literature on the causes of economic growth, we still have a long way to go in understanding why the growth experiences of countries differ so much, why growth changes so much (for good and ill) over time, and why only a handful of developing countries have seen their incomes converge to the levels observed in developed countries. To understand the causes of economic growth, we first need to understand what growth *is*. Much of the focus in the academic and policy literature on "growth" has been on steady-state or long-run average rates of growth of output per capita, or equivalently, comparing *levels* of income. But the focus on one single growth rate for a particular country misses the point that most countries observe dramatic changes in their growth of per capita income. We present *visually* the *dynamics* of the growth experiences of 125 countries. The graphs themselves (and embedded numeric information) highlight the key point that we would like to convey in this Handbook – that economic growth is dynamic and episodic and that many countries have gone through very different growth phases. We identify the timing and magnitude of "breaks" or "episodes" or "regime transitions" for all our 125 countries from the application of a standard statistical procedure. Viewing economic growth as transitions across growth phases would imply that we would need to move beyond current approaches to growth, and that new "third generation" theoretical models and empirical methods would need to be developed to understand what determines economic growth.



Part I

Economic Growth: Getting the Question Right

Part I: Economic Growth: Getting the Question Right

> Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia's or Egypt's? If so, what, exactly? If not, what is it about the "nature of India" that makes it so? The consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.
>
> ROBERT E. LUCAS 1988

Why are there such significant and persistent differences in living standards across countries? This is one of the most important and challenging areas of development policy. These differences arise primarily due to different rates of economic growth across countries. In spite of a voluminous literature on the causes of economic growth: it is *still* "hard to think about anything else". We still have a long way to go in understanding why the growth experiences of countries differ so much, why growth changes so much (for good and ill) over time, and why only a handful of developing countries have seen their incomes converge to the levels observed in developed countries – and "what, exactly" could be done about it.

To understand the causes of economic growth, we first need to understand what growth *is*. Much of the focus in the academic and policy literature on "growth" has been on steady-state or long-run average rates of growth of output per capita, or equivalently, comparing *levels* of income (e.g. Barro, 1991, 1996, 1997; Acemoglu *et al.*, 2001, 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999). But the focus on *one single* growth rate for a particular country misses the point that most countries observe dramatic changes in their growth of per capita income.

Lucas's concern that slow growth might be the "nature of India" reflected the possibility India was trapped in the so-called "Hindu rate of growth". But it wasn't the "nature of India" to grow slowly. But, only a few years after he wrote, India came out of an incipient macroeconomic crisis in 1991. From 1991 to 2010, GDP per capita grew at a pace of 4.8 percent per annum (ppa) compared with the pace of 2.5 percent from 1970 to 1991. GDP in 2010 was USD 1.45 *trillion* higher than had the previous pace continued (calculation

based on 2005 international currency units of the Penn World Tables 7.1) and the cumulative output gain of the higher growth trajectory of 1991-2010 versus 1970-1991 was over USD 8 trillion. Staggering indeed!

Long-run growth averages within countries, therefore, mask distinct periods of success and failure (Easterly *et al.*, 1993; Ben-David and Papell, 1998; Pritchett, 2000; Jones and Olken, 2008; Jerzmanowski, 2006; Kerekes 2012). While the growth process of all "developed" economies is well characterized by a single growth rate and a "business cycle" around that trend (at least until the recent crises) – this is not true for most countries in the world (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). Massive discrete *changes* in growth are common in developing countries. Most developing countries experience distinct growth *episodes:* growth accelerations and decelerations or collapses (Rodrik, 1999, 2003; Hausmann *et al.*, 2006; Aizenman and Spiegel, 2010). For policymakers, and business people too, what matters is not the infinite horizon level, but what will happen to output growth in the medium term (five to ten years), when economic growth is unstable and highly unpredictable in most countries (Pritchett and Werker 2012).

This Handbook describes *visually* in graphs (and numbers) the *dynamics* of the growth experiences of 125 countries. We use the chained real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ("rgdpch") from the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 7.1 for each country for the years available (with the earliest starting year being 1950, and the ending year for all countries being 2010). For each country, we provide a set of **eight** *exactly comparable* graphs; each captures some essential features of the dynamics of economic growth. The emphasis is on a *visual* presentation of the varied experiences of economic growth across the world and we avoid tables to give the reader (viewer) a *feel* of growth. The graphs themselves (and embedded numeric information) highlight the key point that we would like to convey in this Handbook – that economic growth is dynamic and episodic and that countries have gone through very different growth phases.

Our objective here is **'to get the question right'** – *what are the empirical phenomena to be explained by a theory and empirics explaining 'economic growth'*? By presenting graphs that summarize the evolution of output per capita in a variety of ways we show that the phenomenon of "growth" to be explained is much more than just a single "growth rate". But we consciously do not propose any "answers" – we are scrupulously free of any assertions about the "causes" of any aspect of growth.[1] Our goal is to describe adequately the "Left Hand Side" – the level and time evolution of GDP per capita. We deliberately do not present any "Right Hand Side"as correlates (much less assert these are "determinants") of the dynamics of economic growth.

The rest of the Handbook is in three parts.

Part II presents visually the stylized facts of economic growth. For each of 125 countries we present four *exactly comparable* graphs that summarize different aspects of the growth experience and are a visual rendition of standard summary statistics (growth, growth by decade, volatility of growth, comparison with world average growth, etc.). Our value added is *comparability*, as we solve the prosaic, but surprisingly unaddressed, problem that, since nearly all graphs of GDP per capita adjust the vertical and horizontal scales to the data of the particular country, the visual "slope"

1 There is a vast literature on the so-called 'growth empirics' which are studies on the causes of growth. A few examples: Edwards (1993) and Rodriquez and Rodrik (2001) on trade; Levine (1997) on finance; Barro and McCleary (2003) on religion; Hausmann *et al.* (2007) and Hidalgo et al. (2007) on product space; and Jones and Olken (2005) on political leadership.

of the graphs is not comparable. In fact, the automatic adjustments of the scale of the vertical axis done by nearly all spreadsheets or statistical programs cause countries with 1 percent, 3 percent and 5 percent growth to look exactly alike.

In Part III, we provide more structure and examine "breaks" in growth. We do this by implementing a modified version of a statistical method (Bai-Perron) that is commonly used to identify breaks in the GDP per capita series. Using this method, we demarcate each country's growth experience into distinct growth phases and present our results graphically. The graphs show that economic growth in many countries has apparently discrete and quantitatively massive transitions between periods of high growth, periods of negative growth, and periods of stagnation. Further, we establish when these periods started and ended, and what have been the magnitudes of GDP per capita change in each of these episodes. We also highlight the common features of the growth experiences of very disparate countries – features that a focus only on a single time-averaged growth rate, or even that allow growth to vary in units of decades (e.g. 70s vs 80s), miss.

Our view is that we are moving into a "third generation" of growth research. First generation growth theory was Solow-Swan and its variants (Solow, 1956; Barro *et al.*, 1995; Barro and Sala-i-Martin; 1992, 1995, 1997; Jones, 1997; Mankiw *et al.,* 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1996a, 1996b). The "second generation" had a theoretical and empirical component. The "endogenous growth" models provided theoretical models with interesting comparative dynamics of steady state growth rates by endogenizing technical change (Romer, 1986, 1990, 1993; Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 2009; Helpman, 2004). The "second generation" of empirics started with Barro (1991) type regressions and progressed from throwing every conceivable variable on the "Right Hand Side" (e.g. Sala-i-Martin's 1997 'four million" regressions) to using more sophisticated panel data methods and more careful and robust selection of the set of instrumental variables (Islam, 1995; Jones, 1995; Levine and Renelt, 1992). The "second generation" also included theoretical and empirical work on the *levels* of income (e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999) including the emphasis on the role of "institutions" in determining long-run levels/growth rates (e.g. Acemoglu *et al.*, 2001, 2002, 2004; Acemoglu *et al.*, 2003; North *et al.*, 2009; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Rodrik *et al.,* 2004).

But the principal variable of interest in theoretical and empirical "second generation" literature is the level of output or long-run or time-averaged growth rate of per capita output. As we conclude in Part IV, this visual Handbook shows that such a conceptualization of growth is not a complete description of the reality of economic growth in developing countries.[2] Viewing economic growth as transitions across growth phases would imply that new "third generation" theoretical models and empirical methods would need to be developed to understand what determines economic growth. We hope that the next stage of research in economic growth will be to use a different set of Left Hand Side variables – including perhaps some we present in Part III of the Handbook.

2 To be fair to our intellectual forbears in the "first generation" of theoretical work, Hicks in Capital and Growth (1965) pointed out the growth theory of the "comparative dynamics" of differences in steady state growth rates was the least relevant branch of economics to developing countries, as their growth dynamics were dominated by "catch up" growth and "structural transformation" that were clearly incompatible with "steady state" differences in dynamics in which, almost by definition, all key ratios of the economy had to be constant.



Part II

Section I: Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Growth

Part II: Section I: Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Growth

What are the stylized facts of economic growth? In this part, we present the summary features of economic growth using PWT 7.1 data on real GDP per capita for 125 countries, both developed and developing. Our sample contains all countries from PWT 7.1 which have data at least since 1970 and with a population in 2000 of over 700,000. These cut-offs exclude mostly the new countries formed after the breakdown of the Soviet empire (e.g. Tajikistan, Croatia), very small nation-states (mostly small oil-states, e.g. Bahrain, Brunei), small islands in the Caribbean (e.g. Bermuda) and Pacific (e.g. Tonga) and some countries, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, for which PWT 7.1 GDP per capita data is only available from the mid-1980s.

In the following section, we present four graphs per country.

Figure 1 presents the plot of natural log (Ln) GDP per capita (GDPPC) for the country. On the plot are shown the growth rates overall (all available data) plus overall the decadal and five-year growth rates (ten-year growth rates at the top of the line graph and five-year growth rates at the bottom of the graph). Unless otherwise specified, all reported "growth rates" are the coefficient from an OLS regression of ln(GDPPC) on a time trend over the specified period.[3]

The top left hand side of Figure 1 presents three summary statistics:

i) **g** – the OLS growth rate over the available data.
ii) $\mathbf{R}^2$ – the R-square of regressing ln(GDPPC) on a single time trend
iii) $\sigma_{\Delta Y}$ – the standard deviation of the annual log changes in GDPPC.

"The" growth rate (g) is the single number of "growth" and is conventionally used in single cross-section growth regressions (usually over some common period). The other two summary statistics provide a characterization of the temporal behaviour of the GDPPC series.

When growth is moderate and steady (e.g. Denmark R^2=0.96) or rapid (e.g. Thailand R^2=0.98) the R^2 is very high (well above 0.9). A lower R^2 suggests either very low growth (Senegal R^2=0.1, g=0.1) or that the time evolution of output is not well-summarized by a single trend line (Republic of Congo R^2=0.6 even with g=1.6).

3 There are of course many other ways of calculating a "growth rate" – one could take the annual growth rates (as log first difference) and average them, or one could calculate the total change endpoint to endpoint and compute the exponential growth rate that would have achieved that change, one could just take N-period ln differences and divide by N.

4 Of course the standard measure of "cyclical" volatility through a decomposition into "trend" and "deviation around a trend" presumes there is a stable "trend", which, in our view, and as Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) emphasize, gets the cart before the horse by assuming that the "cycle" (which isn't really a "cycle") is not what determines the "trend".

The standard deviation of the first differences of ln(GDPPC) – $\sigma_{\Delta Y}$ – is one measure of growth rate volatility.[4] Developed economies tend to be quite stable by this measure (USA $\sigma_{\Delta Y}$=2.6, Belgium $\sigma_{\Delta Y}$=2.3), while developing economies have much higher volatility, almost always above 4, even in relatively stable middle income countries (Indonesia $\sigma_{\Delta Y}$=4.3, Turkey $\sigma_{\Delta Y}$=5.4) and reaching spectacular highs in unstable countries (Nigeria $\sigma_{\Delta Y}$=7.8).

For all countries the horizontal and vertical axes are the same, so that the "eyeball slope" (vertical gain per horizontal movement) represents the same gain in ln(GDPPC) per unit time across all graphs. While the *levels* of GDPPC are not comparable across country graphs, each vertical axes has 2.1 log units (the *absolute* values of the y-axis are set for each country by placing the lowest value of the vertical axis .1 ln units below the minimum value of ln (GDPPC) for each country)[5]. The levels of GDP per capita in USD for each country at its minimum, maximum and median are indicated on the right axis. This common scaling does mean some countries have lots of "white space" and some countries (e.g. Taiwan, the Republic of Korea) have their graph disappear out the top.[6] The advantage is that, unlike every other graph of economic growth you have ever seen, what looks steeper in one country than another really does represent a faster growth rate. It is not an artefact of compressing the horizontal (to years available) or vertical (to minimize white space or display all data) scales.

Table 1 presents a tabular overview of Figure 1 by classifying each of the 125 countries by (i) growth rate (above or below zero), (ii) volatility ($\sigma_{\Delta Y}$ above or below 3.0) and (iii) goodness of fit of a single time trend (weak fit, $R^2 < 0.5$, moderate fit, $0.9 > R^2 > 0.5$ and strong fit, $R^2 > 0.9$).

All 38 countries with weak fit ($R^2 < 0.5$) have high volatility ($\sigma_{\Delta Y} > 3.0$). As can be seen even in the simplest graph, and in more detail in the others, most of these countries exhibit very sharp and massive growth breaks and multiple growth regimes, often with strongly positive growth followed by negative growth. For instance, Ethiopia had moderate positive growth in the 1950s and 1960s, negative growth in the 1970s and 1980s, but has had rapid growth ($g = 5.4$) recently and hence has overall $g = 0.5$, $R^2 = 0.29$, and $\sigma_{\Delta Y} = 6.1$). While most of the 38 "weak fit" countries are Sub-Saharan African, there are countries from other regions as well, such as Albania and Poland from Eastern Europe, Iran and Jordan from the Middle East, and Papua New Guinea from the South Pacific and Bangladesh in South Asia. For countries where fit is weak, either (a) it makes little sense to think of representing the time evolution of output as a *single* growth rate for each country or (b) the single stable trend growth rate is very near zero (positive or negative).

The 10 of the 38 with weak fit, high volatility, and negative growth ($g < 0$) include conflict affected and "failing states" – Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq – but also non-conflict weak performers – Zambia, Nigeria, Togo.

In the 40 countries with moderate fit ($0 < R^2 < 0.9$) growth transitions and episodes are also pronounced and volatility is high (only 2 have $\sigma_{\Delta Y}$<3.0 –

5 Setting the vertical axes so that all countries – from the USA to Ethiopia – are on the same absolute scale causes nearly all countries to look like the same flat line, with little gain.

6 The vertical scale of 2.1 units means that countries with more than an 8.2 fold (=exp(2.1)) increase in GDPPC go out the top of the graph before reaching 2010. On the other hand, expanding the vertical scale for every country, so that the Republic of Korea and Singapore's data would fit, caused most countries' variations to nearly disappear.

Guatemala and South Africa, both at $\sigma_{\Delta Y} = 2.6$). The regional background of countries in this category is more mixed. We have countries from every region, including Asia and Europe. Greece, a (borderline) advanced economy, is here too. Many of these countries have moderate overall growth rates, but massive differences over time. Peru, for instance, had g = 4.8 in 2000-2010 but g = -2.4 in the 1980s. This is a *range* of decade growth rates of 7.2 ppa (compared with a standard deviation of decade growth rates across countries of only around 2 ppa).

Interestingly, three of the 'miracle growth' countries identified by the Commission for Growth and Development (2008) – Brazil, Japan and Oman – are in this category, which demonstrates just how much growth rates change over time. Brazil had g = 5.5 in the 1970s but g = -0.1 in the 1980s, Japan had among the most "miraculous" growth rates of all time in the 1960s, g = 8.8, but tepid growth (g =0.6) in the 1990s.

In this "moderate fit" category with $g < 0$ are states with sufficient economic decline to create a moderate fit around a negative trend, e.g. Liberia g = -4.1, Somalia g = -1.8, Niger g = -1.4, Madagascar g = -1.1).

The 14 countries with strong fit (R-square > 0.9) and low volatility ($\sigma_{\Delta Y} < 3.0$) include 12 developed countries, Colombia and, perhaps surprisingly, Pakistan. Note that stable growth at moderate rates is a "typical" pattern for rich industrial countries, but extremely rare among developing countries.

The 31 countries with strong fit, positive growth and high volatility are a mixed bag. The rapid catch up countries of the OECD (Spain, Finland, Ireland, Portugal) are here. So are the high performing East Asian countries (China, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam). But there are also countries from other regions – India, Sri Lanka and Nepal from South Asia, Botswana and Lesotho from Sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia from the Middle East and North Africa, and Dominican Republic and Mexico from Latin America and the Caribbean.

Of course to have strong fit around a negative trend ($g < 0$) a country has to be a consistent basket case of growth. The Central African Republic has had negative growth in each of the last four decades.

Table 1: Summary of Growth Experiences across the World

	g>0		g<0	
	$\sigma_{\Delta y} > 3.0$	$\sigma_{\Delta y} < 3.0$	$\sigma_{\Delta y} > 3.0$	$\sigma_{\Delta y} < 3.0$
$0 < R^2 < 0.5$	AGO, ALB, BDI, BGD, BOL, CIV, CMR, ETH, GAB, GHA, GUY, IRN, JOR, KEN, LBN, MNG, MWI, NAM, PNG, POL, RWA, SEN, SLE, TCD, UGA, VEN, ZWE		AFG, GIN, GMB, GNB, HTI, IRQ, NGA, NIC, TGO, ZMB	
$0.5 \leq R^2 < 0.9$	ARG, BEN, BFA, BGR, BRA, CHE, CHL, COG, CUB, DZA, ECU, FJI, GRC, HND, HUN, JAM, JPN, KHM, MLI, MOZ, MRT, MUS, OMN, PER, PHL, PRY, ROM, SDN, SLV, SWZ, SYR, TTO, TZA, URY	GTM, ZAF	LBR, MDG, NER, SOM, ZAR	
$0.9 \leq R^2 < 1$	AUS, BWA, CHN, CRI, CYP, DOM, EGY, ESP, FIN, HKG, IDN, IND, IRL, ISR, KOR, LAO, LKA, LSO, MAR, MEX, MYS, NPL, NZL, PAN, PRI, PRT, SGP, THA, TUN, TUR, TWN, VNM	AUT, BEL, CAN, COL, DNK, FRA, GBR, DEU, ITA, NLD, NOR, PAK, SWE, USA	CAF	

Figure 2 presents a different view of growth by showing the *level* of each country's ln(GDPPC) relative to all other countries at its first year of data and in 2010 (with data starting in 1960 or 1970).

The diagonal lines demarcate different growth benchmarks. Since the axes are equal, zero growth is a 45 degree line (adjusting for aspect ratio) and countries below this line finished 2010 poorer than they started. The 2% line is (roughly) the average economic growth rate across all countries, so countries above grew faster than average and below slower than average. Countries above the 4% line grew (roughly) one cross-national standard deviation (about 2 ppa) above the average (also about 2 ppa).

Figure 2 also shows numerically the level (not natural log) of GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the available data and the ratio of the two. It also provides information on the relative rank (from the bottom) of the country's per capita income.

The USA provides a nice benchmark, as it was near the top in 1960 (103 of 104) and stayed near the top (102 of 104 in 2010) but growing at almost exactly the average pace (g=2.1 in Figure 1) and hence increasing GDPPC by a factor of 2.7.[7] Countries with a ratio higher than 2.7 converged on the leader; those with ratios less than 2.7 did not. There is little evidence of *unconditional* relative income convergence for most developing countries (Pritchett, 1997) but some countries with massive gains. The Republic of Korea (USD1656) and The Philippines (USD1459) started out with similar levels of per capita income in 1960. The Republic of Korea's GDPPC in 2010 was 16.1 times higher, USD26,609 – by 2010 it had converged on developed country levels. GDPPC in The Philippines only went up by a factor of 2.2 – which is real progress – but fell relative to the leaders. Most developing countries were like the Philippines in not exhibiting income convergence, but some converging – and some of the rapid convergers had very big populations (e.g. China, India, Indonesia).

Figure 3 plots the first differences of ln GDPPC (which is roughly the annual percent growth rate of GDPPC) and the five-year moving average (MA) of the first differences. As in Figure 2, we benchmark the world average growth rate of 2% with a horizontal solid line, and the growth rates of 0% and 4% (about a cross-national standard deviation above and below) with two broken horizontal lines.

This figure captures the *volatility* in the GDPPC growth series over time. The number of times the five-year MA of a particular country crosses **both** the two broken horizontal lines gives us an indication of how volatile the growth rate of GDPPC for that country is. For stable countries, most of the annual observations and nearly all the smoothed five year moving averages are inside these lines – they mostly experience in each year a "typical" growth rate. But for many countries, even the smoothed five-year MA of first differences crosses *both* the 0% and 4% horizontal lines multiple times. For instance, Jordan has a low growth rate (g =0.9) and high volatility ($\sigma_{\Delta Y}$ = 9.8), so the MA crosses the 0% and 4% lines 11 times.

Figure 4 compares the distribution of all eight-year (overlapping) growth rates of the particular country with the distribution of all eight-year growth rates for the rest of the world (of course we could have done this for any other number of years). That is, we calculate all possible overlapping growth rates of duration eight-years (e.g. 1960-67, 1961-68, 1962-69, etc) for each country in the world.

We allocated these growth rates into six discrete bins (shown as the groups of bars on Figure 4): (i) growth less than -2.0% (growth collapse); (ii) growth between -2.0% and zero (negative growth); (iii) growth rate between zero and +2.0% (stagnation); (iv) growth between +2.0% and +4.0% (moderate growth); (v) growth between +4.0% and +6.0% (strong growth); and (vi) growth above +6.0% (rapid growth). Since the world average growth rate is 2.0% per annum, and the standard deviation (SD) of the world average growth rate is 2.0, these bins correspond roughly to an empirical "normal" distribution of growth rates.

Figure 4 shows that the same average growth rate can result from very different distributions of growth rates over time. Developed economies, like the UK, had g = 2.4 and nearly all of its eight-year growth rates were between 0% and 4%. But between 1970 and 2010 Cambodia has almost exactly the same average growth rate (g = 2.3), but did so by spending

7 These two being linked of course by the formula: $Ratio = \frac{yt+N^{y}}{yt}\frac{t+N}{yt} = (1+g)^{N}$, though this will not be exact, as g is an OLS estimate, not calculated endpoint to endpoint.

substantial time in collapse ($g < -2$) and substantial time in rapid growth ($g > 6$).

Some countries were reasonably consistent growth "stars" and spent most time with $g > 4$ (e.g. Singapore, the Republic of Korea). Other countries were consistently poor performers (e.g. Central African Republic, Senegal).

As an example of how the four figures look like for a particular country, we present Figures 1-4 for Uganda below. Figure 1 shows that decadal growth rates varied from -4 % in the 1970s to +4.4% in the 1990s, in the context of a low average rate of growth of 0.4% per annum. Figure 2 shows that Uganda's relative rank in GDPPC has changed very little in the period 1960-2010 (fifteenth from the bottom in 1960 and sixteenth from the bottom in 2010) and that Uganda's average growth rate in 1960-2010 was below the world average rate of growth of 2% per annum. Figure 3 indicates that GDP per capita growth in Uganda has been volatile, with the MA of GDPPC growth crossing both the 0% and 4% horizontal lines. Finally, Figure 4 shows that Uganda has spent more time than the average country in "growth collapse" and "negative growth", but also spent more time than the average county in "moderate growth". Uganda, then, illustrates very well our point that economic growth can change quite remarkably in a relatively short period of time in a single country, and that focusing on the average rate of growth masks this very significant transition in growth phases.

Uganda

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Uganda



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Uganda



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Uganda



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Uganda vs. world



For many countries the following seemingly paradoxical fact is that *knowing* what country the growth rate comes from *increases* the variance of your guess of the growth rate. That is, suppose you were drawing a country eight-year period growth rate from the world distribution of growth rates, you would know that the standard deviation is about 2 and the likelihood of being in either "collapse" or "rapid growth" is about 5%. But if we tell you that you are just choosing from the eight-year growth experiences of a country like Ghana, Nigeria, Jordan, Cambodia, Mozambique and Malawi, then your uncertainty about what you will find *increases.* These countries show more variation in the distribution of their growth episodes than the variation in growth rates across all countries in the world. These countries have spent more time in **both** rapid growth and growth collapse than the "typical" country.

Section II: Country Graphs

Afghanistan

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Afghanistan



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Afghanistan



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Afghanistan



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Afghanistan vs. world



Albania

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Albania



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Albania



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Albania



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Albania vs. world



Algeria

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Algeria



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Algeria



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Algeria



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Algeria vs. world



Angola

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Angola



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Angola



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Angola



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Angola vs. world



Argentina

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Argentina



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Argentina



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Argentina



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Argentina vs. world



Australia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Australia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Australia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Australia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Australia vs. world



Austria

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Austria



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Austria



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Austria



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Austria vs. world



Bangladesh

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Bangladesh



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Bangladesh



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Bangladesh



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Bangladesh vs. world



Belgium

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Belgium



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Belgium



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Belgium



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Belgium vs. world



Benin

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Benin



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Benin



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Benin



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Benin vs. world



Bolivia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Bolivia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Bolivia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Bolivia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Bolivia vs. world



Botswana

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Botswana



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Botswana



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Botswana



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Botswana vs. world



Brazil

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Brazil



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Brazil



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Brazil



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Brazil vs. world



Bulgaria

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Bulgaria



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Bulgaria



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Bulgaria



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Bulgaria vs. world



Burkina Faso

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Burkina Faso



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Burkina Faso



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Burkina Faso



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Burkina Faso vs. world



Burundi

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Burundi



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Burundi



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Burundi



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Burundi vs. world



Cambodia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Cambodia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Cambodia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Cambodia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Cambodia vs. world



Cameroon

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Cameroon



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Cameroon



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Cameroon



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Cameroon vs. world



Canada

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Canada



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Canada



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Canada



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Canada vs. world



Central African Republic

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Central African Republic



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Central African Republic



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Central African Republic



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Central African Republic vs. world



Chad

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Chad



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Chad



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Chad



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Chad vs. world



Chile

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Chile



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Chile



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Chile



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Chile vs. world



China

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: China Version 1



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: China Version 1



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: China Version 1



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
China Version 1 vs. world



Colombia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Colombia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Colombia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Colombia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Colombia vs. world



Congo, Rep.

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Congo, Republic of



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Congo, Republic of



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Congo, Republic of



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Congo, Republic of vs. world



Congo, Dem Rep.

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Congo, Dem. Rep.



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Congo, Dem. Rep.



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Congo, Dem. Rep.



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Congo, Dem. Rep. vs. world



Costa Rica

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Costa Rica



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Costa Rica



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Costa Rica



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Costa Rica vs. world



Côte d'Ivoire

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Cote d'Ivoire



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Cote d'Ivoire



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Cote d'Ivoire



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Cote d'Ivoire vs. world



Cuba

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Cuba



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Cuba



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Cuba



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Cuba vs. world



Cyprus

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Cyprus



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Cyprus



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Cyprus



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Cyprus vs. world



Denmark

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Denmark



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Denmark



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Denmark



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Denmark vs. world



Dominican Republic

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Dominican Republic



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Dominican Republic



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Dominican Republic



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Dominican Republic vs. world



Ecuador

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Ecuador



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Ecuador



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Ecuador



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Ecuador vs. world



Egypt, Arab Rep.

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Egypt



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Egypt



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Egypt



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Egypt vs. world



El Salvador

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: El Salvador



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: El Salvador



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: El Salvador



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
El Salvador vs. world



Ethiopia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Ethiopia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Ethiopia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Ethiopia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Ethiopia vs. world



Fiji

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Fiji



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Fiji



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Fiji



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Fiji vs. world



Finland

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Finland



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Finland



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Finland



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Finland vs. world



France

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: France



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: France



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: France



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
France vs. world



Gabon

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Gabon



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Gabon



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Gabon



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Gabon vs. world



Gambia, The

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Gambia, The



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Gambia, The



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Gambia, The



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Gambia, The vs. world



Germany

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Germany



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Germany



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Germany



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Germany vs. world



Ghana

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Ghana



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Ghana



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Ghana



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Ghana vs. world



Greece

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Greece



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Greece



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Greece



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Greece vs. world



Guatemala

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Guatemala



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Guatemala



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Guatemala



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Guatemala vs. world



Guinea

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Guinea



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Guinea



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Guinea



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Guinea vs. world



Guinea-Bissau

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Guinea-Bissau



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Guinea-Bissau



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Guinea-Bissau



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Guinea-Bissau vs. world



Guyana

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Guyana



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Guyana



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Guyana



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Guyana vs. world



Haiti

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Haiti



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Haiti



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Haiti



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Haiti vs. world



Honduras

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Honduras



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Honduras



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Honduras



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Honduras vs. world



Hong Kong SAR, China

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Hong Kong



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Hong Kong



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Hong Kong



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Hong Kong vs. world



Hungary

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Hungary



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Hungary



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Hungary



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Hungary vs. world



India

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: India



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: India



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: India



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
India vs. world



Indonesia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Indonesia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Indonesia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Indonesia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Indonesia vs. world



Iran, Islamic Rep.

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Iran



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Iran



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Iran



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Iran vs. world



Iraq

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Iraq



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Iraq



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Iraq



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Iraq vs. world



Ireland

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Ireland



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Ireland



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Ireland



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Ireland vs. world



Israel

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Israel



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Israel



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Israel



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Israel vs. world



Italy

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Italy



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Italy



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Italy



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Italy vs. world



Jamaica

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Jamaica



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Jamaica



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Jamaica



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Jamaica vs. world



Japan


Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Japan
Max.
32775
22756
Med.
18749
Min.
2787
g_{50s}: 6.3
g_{60s}: 8.8
g_{70s}: 2.9
g_{80s}: 3.9
g_{90s}: 0.6
g_{00s}: 0.7
g: 4.1
R^2: 0.89
$\sigma_{\Delta y}$: 3.9
6.7 6.6 8.1 10.2 3.2 3.5 2.9 4.9 0.6 0.1 1.1 −0.5
Ln(GDPPC)
Years


Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Japan
4% growth
2% growth
0% growth
jpn
jpn Rank
1960 5586 79/103
2010 31447 87/103
Ratio 5.6
Level of GDPPC, 2010
Level of GDPPC, 1960


Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Japan
First Differences ln(GDPPC)
Years


Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Japan vs. world
g<−2.0
−2.0<g<0.0
0.0<g<2.0
2.0<g<4.0
4.0<g<6.0
g>6.0
All Countries
Japan
Average growth 4.1
Fraction of growth rates in category
Growth categories

Jordan

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Jordan



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Jordan



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Jordan



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Jordan vs. world



Kenya

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Kenya



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Kenya



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Kenya



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Kenya vs. world



Korea, Rep.

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Korea, Republic of



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Korea, Republic of



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Korea, Republic of



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Korea, Republic of vs. world



Lao PDR

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Laos



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Laos



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Laos



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Laos vs. world



Lebanon

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Lebanon



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Lebanon



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Lebanon



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Lebanon vs. world



Lesotho

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Lesotho



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Lesotho



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Lesotho



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Lesotho vs. world



Liberia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Liberia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Liberia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Liberia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Liberia vs. world



Madagascar

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Madagascar



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Madagascar



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Madagascar



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Madagascar vs. world



Malawi

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Malawi



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Malawi



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Malawi



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Malawi vs. world



Malaysia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Malaysia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Malaysia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Malaysia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Malaysia vs. world



Mali

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Mali



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Mali



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Mali



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Mali vs. world



Mauritania

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Mauritania



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Mauritania



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Mauritania



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Mauritania vs. world



Mauritius

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Mauritius



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Mauritius



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Mauritius



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Mauritius vs. world



Mexico

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Mexico



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Mexico



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Mexico



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Mexico vs. world



Mongolia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Mongolia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Mongolia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Mongolia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Mongolia vs. world



Morocco

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Morocco



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Morocco



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Morocco



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Morocco vs. world



Mozambique

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Mozambique



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Mozambique



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Mozambique



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Mozambique vs. world



Namibia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Namibia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Namibia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Namibia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Namibia vs. world



Nepal

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Nepal



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Nepal



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Nepal



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Nepal vs. world



Netherlands

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Netherlands



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Netherlands



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Netherlands



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Netherlands vs. world



New Zealand

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: New Zealand



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: New Zealand



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: New Zealand



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
New Zealand vs. world



Nicaragua

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Nicaragua



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Nicaragua



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Nicaragua



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Nicaragua vs. world



Niger

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Niger



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Niger



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Niger



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Niger vs. world



Nigeria

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Nigeria



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Nigeria



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Nigeria



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Nigeria vs. world



Norway

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Norway



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Norway



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Norway



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Norway vs. world



Oman

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Oman



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Oman



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Oman



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Oman vs. world



Pakistan

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Pakistan



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Pakistan



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Pakistan



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Pakistan vs. world



Panama

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Panama



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Panama



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Panama



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Panama vs. world



Papua New Guinea

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Papua New Guinea



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Papua New Guinea



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Papua New Guinea



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Papua New Guinea vs. world



Paraguay

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Paraguay



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Paraguay



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Paraguay



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Paraguay vs. world



Peru

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Peru



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Peru



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Peru



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Peru vs. world



Philippines

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Philippines



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Philippines



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Philippines



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Philippines vs. world



Poland

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Poland



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Poland



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Poland



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Poland vs. world



Portugal

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Portugal



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Portugal



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Portugal



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Portugal vs. world



Puerto Rico

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Puerto Rico



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Puerto Rico



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Puerto Rico



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Puerto Rico vs. world



Romania

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Romania



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Romania



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Romania



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Romania vs. world



Rwanda

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Rwanda



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Rwanda



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Rwanda



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Rwanda vs. world



Senegal

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Senegal



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Senegal



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Senegal



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Senegal vs. world



Sierra Leone

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Sierra Leone



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Sierra Leone



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Sierra Leone



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Sierra Leone vs. world



Singapore

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Singapore



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Singapore



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Singapore



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Singapore vs. world



Somalia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Somalia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Somalia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Somalia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Somalia vs. world



South Africa

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: South Africa



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: South Africa



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: South Africa



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
South Africa vs. world



Spain

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Spain



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Spain



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Spain



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Spain vs. world



Sri Lanka

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Sri Lanka



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Sri Lanka



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Sri Lanka



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Sri Lanka vs. world



Sudan

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Sudan



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Sudan



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Sudan



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Sudan vs. world



Swaziland

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Swaziland



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Swaziland



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Swaziland



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Swaziland vs. world



Sweden

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Sweden



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Sweden



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Sweden



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Sweden vs. world



Switzerland

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Switzerland



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Switzerland



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Switzerland



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Switzerland vs. world



Syrian Arab Republic

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Syria



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Syria



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Syria



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Syria vs. world



Taiwan

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Taiwan



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Taiwan



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Taiwan



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Taiwan vs. world



Tanzania

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Tanzania



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Tanzania



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Tanzania



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Tanzania vs. world



Thailand

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Thailand



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Thailand



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Thailand



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Thailand vs. world



Togo

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Togo



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Togo



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Togo



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Togo vs. world



Trinidad and Tobago

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Trinidad &Tobago



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Trinidad &Tobago



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Trinidad &Tobago



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Trinidad &Tobago vs. world



Tunisia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Tunisia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Tunisia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Tunisia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Tunisia vs. world



Turkey

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Turkey



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Turkey



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Turkey



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Turkey vs. world



Uganda

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Uganda



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Uganda



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Uganda



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Uganda vs. world



United Kingdom

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: United Kingdom



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: United Kingdom



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: United Kingdom



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
United Kingdom vs. world



United States

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: United States



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: United States



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: United States



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
United States vs. world



Uruguay

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Uruguay



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Uruguay



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Uruguay



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Uruguay vs. world



Venezuela, RB

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Venezuela



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Venezuela



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Venezuela



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Venezuela vs. world



Vietnam

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Vietnam



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Vietnam



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Vietnam



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Vietnam vs. world



Zambia

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Zambia



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Zambia



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Zambia



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Zambia vs. world



Zimbabwe

Figure 1: Overall, ten, and five year growth rates: Zimbabwe



Figure 2: Initial and Final level of GDPPC: Zimbabwe



Figure 3: (ln) First Differences and five year MA: Zimbabwe



Figure 4: Distribution of all 8 year growth rates
Zimbabwe vs. world





Part III

Section I: Viewing Economic Growth as Transitions in Growth Regimes

Part III: Section I: Viewing Economic Growth as Transitions in Growth Regimes

We have seen in Part II that the average or long-run rate of economic growth is a poor approximation of country growth experiences, and that countries make frequent transitions between periods of high growth, periods of negative growth and periods of stagnation. To understand economic growth, we need to understand why most countries switch from one growth regime to another. This is not straightforward. How do we know when growth is accelerating when, in most low-income countries, income movements are highly volatile, so a movement up or down may be transitory, and not signal a shift in the growth rate? How do we identify a growth break, which is an episode involving a significant change in growth rates implying a transition from one growth regime to another?

In Part III, we present four more graphs per country. Figure 5 is a simple plot of log GDPPC, and also contains the three summary statistics of growth for each country – g, R^2 and $\sigma_{\Delta Y.}$ – that we discussed in Part II. Figure 6 presents our growth breaks – where we modify the Bai-Perron (1998) method using our economic filters. We also report the growth rates pre- and post-break, and the change in the growth rate (Δg) from one growth episode to the next. Figure 7 gives the breaks as identified by the Bai-Perron (henceforth, BP) method to compare with the breaks that we have identified. In most cases, the breaks that we have identified are the same as when we apply the Bai-Perron method without modification. However, in several instances (as in the case of Zimbabwe, for example), we obtain more breaks by our method than if we applied the BP method without modification. In some cases (for example, South Africa), the years identified by the BP break differ from ours – this occurs when we drop the potential break identified by BP, as it does not meet the criteria of a break by our filters; and where the iterative procedure followed by BP leads to a different growth break year. In Figure 8, we report magnitudes of growth in each growth episode using the second of the methods in computing growth magnitudes discussed previously.

Figure 5 replicates Figure 1 (since the figures come either singly or in panels, with four graphs per panel, this makes sure the raw ln(GDPPC) data and graph is present in both panels).

Figure 7 displays the results of one procedure for identifying structural breaks in growth (we describe Figure 7 first, since understanding Figure 6 depends on understanding Figure 7).

The widely used BP methodology (1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2006) estimates the dates of structural breaks in time series. BP is a two-step method. The first step estimates the years to place a given number of breaks that would most increase a test-statistic, while the second step sequentially tests how many of these breaks are statistically significant.

In the first step, it is assumed that the growth rate is a stationary dependent variable that equals a regime-specific mean growth rate plus an error term. To implement a BP procedure the user has to specify the

minimum length of any growth regime (e.g. so the breaks cannot be in sequential years and must be, say, five years apart) and the maximum number of potential candidate breaks. The first step of the BP procedure recursively minimizes the sum of squared residuals, both with respect to the break dates and with respect to the regime-specific mean growth rates, subject to the user provided constraint on the minimum length of a growth regime, up to the maximum number of breaks specified.[8]

We implement BP using a "growth regime" minimum of eight-years. One can user shorter or longer periods, but shorter periods (e.g. three or five years) risk conflation with "business cycle fluctuations" or truly "short run" shocks (e.g. droughts). Longer periods (e.g. 10 or 12 years) for a given length of data reduce the number of potential breaks.

We specify a maximum number of candidate breaks for each country, depending on the length of the series. A country with:

i) Forty years of data (only since 1970), a maximum of two breaks
ii) More than 40 years and up to 55 years (data since 1955), a maximum of three breaks
iii) More than 55 years (before 1955), a maximum of four breaks

The second step of the BP procedure decides which of the candidate breaks are statistically significant. BP suggests a sequential testing procedure that starts at zero breaks and then proceeds until one fails to reject the null hypothesis of n breaks against n+ 1 breaks. The test statistic $\sup F_T$, is the supremum of all the F-statistics testing the equality of means across regimes over all admissible k-partitions. The value of the test statistic is compared with simulated critical values, which depend on the number of breaks and a trimming parameter (which in turn depends on the minimum size of the regime).[9]

The BP procedure identifies both accelerations and decelerations. For instance, the Republic of Korea accelerated in 1962 from a growth of 1.4 ppa to 6.0 ppa, an acceleration of 4.6 ppa. Growth in Nicaragua is estimated to have decelerated in 1977 from 3 to -1.2, a deceleration of 4.2 ppa. Some countries are estimated to have had multiple BP breaks in their growth. For instance, Jamaica is estimated to have experienced a massive deceleration in 1972, from 4.3 ppa before to -3.5 ppa after, a deceleration of 7.8 ppa. But this lasted only until 1980, when growth accelerated from -3.5 ppa to the modest, but positive, pace of 0.7 ppa, an acceleration of 4.2 ppa.

Figure 6 displays the results of transitions in growth that combine the first stage of the BP procedure to identify the "candidate" breaks with a filter for "genuine" breaks that depends on the *magnitudes* and *directions* of the changes in growth, not a purely *statistical* procedure.

In a separate paper we describe and justify our method versus a "pure" BP approach (Kar *et al.*, 2013) and here we just show the graphs of the output. Our filter takes the break years that BP identifies as the best candidates (with four, three, or two candidate years, depending on the length of

8 The Bai-Perron test is robust in that the error term may have different variances across growth regimes and exhibit autocorrelation.

9 In some cases, it is difficult to reject the null of zero against one break, but easy to reject the null of zero against a higher number of breaks. In these cases the testing procedure breaks down. In order to take care of this, Bai and Perron (2006) recommend an adjustment to the procedure that uses an alternative procedure in the first step when the null hypothesis of zero breaks is tested. Here, instead of testing zero against one break point, the hypothesis tests the null of $m = 0$ against the alternative of $1 \leq m \leq M$, where M is chosen exogenously. After this altered first step, the rest of the test proceeds exactly as before.

the data series). We then apply the following filter to rule out changes in growth that are "too small" to be "genuine" breaks in growth (and might just be due to random fluctuations in the data).

i) In case of the first candidate break, since it is not known whether it follows an acceleration or deceleration, any change of more than 2 ppa (up or down) we count as a growth break.

After that, the threshold depends on the previous history:

ii) If a candidate acceleration follows a previous deceleration or a candidate deceleration follows a previous acceleration, then to qualify as a genuine growth break the absolute magnitude of the growth difference has to be 3 ppa.

iii) If, however, a candidate acceleration follows a previous acceleration or a candidate deceleration follows a previous deceleration, then a change of only 1 ppa (in absolute value) qualifies as a genuine break.

Using this method, which is "BP to identify candidate break years plus a magnitude filter"[10], we find a total of 318 structural breaks from the group of 125 countries.

These are provided in Table 2, with the country, year, date of the structural break, growth before the break and growth after the break and the years each growth episode lasts.

The method, the outcome, and the differences with a pure statistically approach like BP are best illustrated with a few examples.

The BP procedure finds only one growth break as statistically significant for Brazil, in 1980, separating growth before 1950-1980 of 4.8 ppa from growth from 1980 to 2010 of 0.7 ppa. The first step of the BP procedure identifies four candidate break years: 1967, 1980, 1992 and 2002. In 1967 growth accelerated from 3.7 in 1950-1967 to 6.3 ppa from 1967 to 1980. Since this is the first and above the 2 ppa threshold, we include it as a break. In 1980 growth decelerates from 6.3 ppa to -1.1 ppa from 1980 to 1992, a deceleration of 7.4 ppa, and easily passes the "deceleration following acceleration" threshold of 3 ppa. In 1992 growth accelerates from -1.1 ppa to 1.4 ppa, a change of 2.5 ppa. However, as this is an acceleration following a deceleration it would have to be above 3 ppa and hence we do not include 1992 as a "genuine" growth break. In 2002 growth accelerated again, this time to 2.5 ppa, and since this was an acceleration following a previous candidate acceleration it only had to pass the 1 ppa threshold.

So our procedure characterizes Brazil's growth regimes as "strong growth" of 3.7 from 1950 to1967, "rapid growth" of 6.3 ppa from 1967 to 1980, "stagnation" from 1980 to 2002, followed by "strong growth" again from 2002 to 2010.

The BP procedure finds only one statistically significant growth break for Ghana, from growth of 0.1 from 1955 to 1983 to growth of 2.6 from 1983 to 2010. Our "BP plus magnitude filter" method classifies all four of the BP candidate break years as breaks and hence has five growth regimes in

10 See Appendix 1 for further discussion of the different methods to identify growth breaks.

Ghana: slow growth 1955-1966; a burst of growth from 1955 to 1966 (g = 3.7); a growth disaster from 1974 to 1983 (g = -4.5); slow growth from 1983 to 2002 (g = 1.9); and strong growth from 2002 to 2010 (g = 4.2).

Our method clearly creates a richer description of the dynamics, but at the risk of identifying periods that were not "true" growth regime switches. There is nothing special about our proposed filter (other than using the "focal point" thresholds of 1, 2, 3), but there is nothing special for purposes of describing growth regimes in a fetishism of "statistical significance" either.

What do the breaks identified by our methodology tell us about the nature of growth transitions? Do we observe any "stylized facts" about transitions based on these results? More specifically, how much do these transitions change the average growth rates of an economy? Table 2 answers some of these questions by classifying all transitions in terms of a four-by-four matrix that captures the relationship between average growth rates before and after a transition. The vertical axis represents growth rates corresponding to the regime before the break, while the horizonal axis represents growth rates corresponding to the regime after the break. Consistent with our approach in Part II, we divide the distribution of average growth rates in both the axes into four bins centred on the world average growth rate of 2% (but combining the lower and upper bins). Thus, the four bins are: (i) $g < 0\%$; (ii) $0\% \leq g < 2\%$; (iii) $2\% \leq g \leq 4\%$; and (iv) $g > 4\%$, where g is the average growth rate of a regime, either before or after a break.

The individual cells of the matrix report all transitions that belong to the corresponding bins in the vertical and horizontal axis, in terms of the country names and the year of transition. Further, for the first column (i.e., for $g < 0$), entries in light coloured shades (pink) represent transitions to growth rates between 0% and -2%, while entries with dark coloured shades (red) represent transitions to growth rates less than -2%. Thus entries with darker shades in this column represent transitions into bigger crisis compared with those with lighter ones. Similarly for the fourth column (i.e., for $g > 4$), entries in light coloured shades (light blue) represent transitions to average growth rates between 4% and 6%, while those with dark colours (dark blue) represent transitions to growth rates higher than 6%. Thus dark coloured entries represent transitions to stronger miracle growth.

Table 2 shows that there are multiple growth transitions corresponding to all 16 cells of the matrix. Moreover, apart from the diagonals that have a lesser possibility of transition by definition (particularly for column two and three that cover a small range of growth rates), all other cells have a large and comparable number of entries. This tells us that the growth transitions resemble a Markov process with comparable probabilities for all types of transitions. Thus, the stylized fact is that when it comes to transitions, anything is possible!

Table 2: Regime Transitions for each Bai-Perron+Filter Break

Growth Before Break	Growth After Break: g<0	Growth After Break: 0≤g<2	Growth After Break: 2≤g≤4	Growth After Break: g>4
g<0	BGD (1967), CAF (1986), CAF (1996), ZAR (1989), COG (1994), ETH (1983), GAB (1987), GIN (2002), MUS (1963), NER (1979), NER (1987), TGO (1993), UGA (1980), ZMB (1975), ZMB (1983), ZWE (2002)	ARG (1985), BDI (2000), BEN (1994), BGD (1982), BOL (1958), BOL (1986), CHL (1976), CMR (1994), GHA (1983), GMB (1995), GNB (1981), GTM (1988), HTI (1994), MDG (2002), MEX (1989), MOZ (1986), NAM (1985), NIC (1979), NIC (1995), PHL (1985), SEN (1973), TCD (1980), VEN (1985)	ZAR (2000), COL (2002), CRI (1991), DZA (1994), ECU (1999), ETH (1992), FJI (1988), GUY (1990), HTI (1972), IRN (1988), JOR (1991), KHM (1982), LBN (1982), LKA (1959), LSO (1986), MLI (1974), MNG (1993), MRT (2002), NGA (1987), PER (1992), PNG (1984), PRY (2002), SLV (1987), TTO (1989), UGA (1961), UGA (1988), ZAF (1993), ZMB (1994)	AFG (1994), AGO (1993), ALB (1992), ARG (2002), BGR (1997), CUB (1995), CYP (1975), FIN (1993), IDN (1968), IRQ (1991), JAM (1986), JOR (1974), LBR (1994), MAR (1960), MUS (1971), MWI (2002), NGA (1968), PAK (1960), POL (1991), ROM (1994), RWA (1994), SDN (1996), SLE (1999), SYR (1989), THA (1958), URY (1985), URY (2002)
0≤g<2	ALB (1982), ARG (1977), ARG (1994), BOL (1977), CHL (1968), ZAR (1974), COL (1994), GMB (1982), GNB (1997), GUY (1981), ITA (2001), MDG (1974), MOZ (1976), NER (1968), NGA (1960), NIC (1987), PER (1981), PRY (1989), ROM (1986), RWA (1981), SLE (1990), SLV (1978), SOM (1978), TCD (1971), TGO (1979), URY (1977), ZWE (1991)	COL (1967), EGY (1965), KEN (1967)	AUS (1961), BFA (1971), BGD (1996), BRA (2002), CMR (1976), DOM (1991), DZA (1971), GTM (1962), HND (1970), IRL (1958), LAO (1979), MAR (1995), NAM (2002), NPL (1983), NZL (1958), PRI (1982), PRT (1985), VEN (2002), ZWE (1968)	BEN (1978), CHL (1986), CHN (1968), DNK (1958), DOM (1968), ECU (1970), EGY (1976), GHA (1966), GHA (2002), HKG (2002), IRL (1987), KOR (1962), MOZ (1995),MWI (1964), MYS (1987), PAN (1959), PAN (2002), PER (1959), PRY (1971), TCD (2000), TZA (2000)

Growth Before Break	Growth After Break: g<0	Growth After Break: 0≤g<2	Growth After Break: 2≤g≤4	Growth After Break: g>4
2≤g≤4	AFG (1986), BDI (1992), CIV (1978), CMR (1984), CRI (1979), CYP (1967), DZA (1979), ETH (1969), FIN (1985), FJI (1979), GTM (1980), HTI (1980), JAM (1972), MEX (1981), MNG (1982), MRT (1976), NAM (1974), NIC (1967) PHL (1977), PNG (1973), PRI (2000), SDN (1978), SWZ (1989), SYR (1981), UGA (1969), VEN (1977), ZAF (1981), ZMB (1967)	AUS (1969), BFA (1979), CHE (1974), DOM (1960), FJI (2000), GBR (2002), HND (1979), IRL (1979), ITA (1990), JPN (1991), MLI (1986), NLD (1974), NZL (1974), PNG (1993), PRT (2000), TUN (1981), ZWE (1983)	FIN (1974), GBR (1981), IND (1993), LBN (1991), TUN (1972)	BEL (1959),BRA (1967), ETH (2002), IND (2002), KHM (1998), LAO (2002), LKA (1973), LSO (1970), MYS (1970), SGP (1968), TTO (2002), TTO (1961), VNM (1989)
g>4	BEN (1986), BGR (1988) COG (1984), CUB (1984), ECU (1978), GAB (1976), GHA (1974),GNB (1970), IRL (2002), IRN (1976), IRQ (1979), JAM (1994), JOR (1965), JOR (1982), LSO (1978), MWI (1978), NGA (1976), POL (1979), TTO (1980), URY (1994)	AUT (1979), BEL (1974), BRA (1980), CHN (1960), ZAR (1958), CYP (1992), DNK (1969), DOM (1976), FIN (2001), GRC (1973), HKG (1994), HUN (1978), ISR (1975), LBR (2002), MAR (1977), MYS (1979), OMN (1985), PAN (1982), PER (1967), PRI (1972), PRT (1973), PRY (1980), ROM (1978), SLE (1970), SYR (1998), TGO (1969), TZA (1971)	BWA (1990), CHL (1997), CRI (1958), EGY (1992), ESP (1974), IDN (1996), ITA (1974), JAM (1961), JPN (1970), KOR (2002), LKA (1981), MRT (1968), MUS (1979), MYS (1996), PAK (1970), PHL (1959), SWZ (1978), THA (1995), TUR (1958), TWN (1994)	AGO (2001), BWA (1973), BWA (1982), CHN (1977), CHN (1991), COG (1976), CYP (1984), GAB (1968), GRC (1960), HKG (1981), ISR (1967), JPN (1959), KOR (1982), KOR (1991), MAR (1968), PRT (1964), RWA (2002), SGP (1980), THA (1987), TWN (1962)

One limitation of a matrix-based approach is that it is sensitive to the choice of the bins. Alternatively, one can estimate the transition probability functions that are based on an infinite number of bins, each with a range tending to zero. In other words, we estimate a continuous version of the matrix in Table 2. The transition probability function corresponding to our transitions is diagrammatically represented in Figures 9 and 10. Figure 9 is a surface plot, with the Y-axis representing growth before the break and the X-axis representing growth after the break. The Z-axis represents the probability of a transition. Figure 10 is a contour plot representing the same transition probability function, with the iso-probability lines representing all transitions that have a similar probability.

Figures 9 and 10 confirm the conclusions of Table 2, for the specific ranges of the bin that were chosen for that table. Thus, starting from any of those four ranges of growth rates on the Y-axis (growth before a break), the surface plot and the contour plot show that there are significant probabilities of a transition to any of the other three ranges on the X-axis (growth after a break). Significantly, Figures 9 and 10 reveal something more about the transitions. They indicate that, irrespective of the growth rates before the transitions, there is a strong tendency to move towards the world average growth rate of about 2% after the transition. This is evident from the shape of the transition probability function, with the highest probability points being bunched parallel to the Y-axis and perpendicular to the X-axis corresponding to the 2% growth rate. This supports the evidence that there is a tendency towards mean-reversion in growth dynamics.

Figure 8 graphs the "magnitude" of the growth accelerations/decelerations in Figure 7. Figures 6 and 7 give alternate breaking of countries' growth experiences into "regimes" or "episodes". However, neither, in and of themselves, provide a sense of the *cumulative magnitude* of episodic shifts. This question is complex for two reasons.

First, the cumulative magnitude is a combination of the magnitude of the shift in growth *rates* per annum and the number of years the episode lasts. So a growth acceleration from 2 ppa to 6 ppa that lasts only eight years produces less cumulative impact than an acceleration from 2 ppa to 4 ppa that lasts 28 years. If we conceptualize the growth process as a probabilistic shift across growth regimes, then cumulative growth performance is obviously the product of duration in each regime times the growth rate while in that regime. As we have seen, the rich industrial countries did not get rich by having very rapid growth rates; rather it was the result of staying consistently in regimes of moderate (or slow) growth.

Second, establishing the cumulative impact of a growth regime transition has to involve some *counter-factual* of what growth would have been without the growth regime transition that was observed. This is, of course, impossible to know with any certainty. There are three obvious possibilities. One is that the country would have stayed at its existing rate of growth. But this ignores one of the most widely replicated and consistent facts about growth – that there is "regression to the mean" over time and little inter-temporal correlation of growth rates (e.g. Easterly *et al.*, 1993), so predicting that a country will remain at its current growth rate is generally a bad prediction. A second is to assume full regression to the mean and that a country's growth rate would have been the world average growth rate over the post-regime transition. This, however, ignores completely the country's previous growth experience and also any tendencies to "convergence".

The graphs here rely on a method described more fully in a separate paper (Pritchett *et al.*, 2013) and calculate "simple predicted" growth by running a separate prediction regression for each growth transition and predicting a country's growth on the basis of its previous growth and its level of GDPPC (convergence). Then the total impact of a growth regime transition

is the difference between the actual growth after the transition and the predicted growth in the post-transition period times the duration of the transition. Again, this is best illustrated with an example (and a graph), for which we will use Uganda.

Our method shows four growth regime transitions – an acceleration in 1961, a deceleration in 1969, an acceleration in 1980 and another acceleration in 1988. Let us illustrate the method with two examples.

In 1969 growth decelerated from 3.0 to -3.6 ppa and this lower rate of growth lasted until 1980 (11 years).[11] The regression prediction of the growth rate from 1969 to 1980 of a country that was growing at a rate of 3.0 from 1961 to 1969 and at Uganda's level of GDPPC in 1969 of USD824 is 2.3 ppa.[12] So the cumulative loss from the growth regime transition in 1969 is (-3.6 – 2.3)*11 = -65.7% – that is, Uganda's GDPPC in 1980 was 66% lower than it would have been had it grown at the predicted rate versus the actual rate.

Table 3: Growth Magnitudes for Uganda

Country	Start year	Level of income at start	Growth before episode	Growth during episode	Simple predicted growth during episode	Episode duration	Cumulative magnitude of growth regime transition gain/loss
Uganda	1961	636	-0.7%	3.0%	1.7%	8	10.4%
Uganda	1969	824	3.0%	-3.6%	2.3%	11	-65.7%
Uganda	1980	536	-3.6%	-0.5%	-1.4%	8	6.8%
Uganda	1988	529	-0.5%	3.5%	1.4%	22	46.0%

In 1980 there was a acceleration that was the end of the collapse from 1969 to 1980 and then in 1988 there was another acceleration. The acceleration of 1988 took growth from -0.5 to 3.5 and the predicted growth from 1988 to 2010 of a country growing at -0.5 ppa from 1980 to 1988 and at Uganda's level of GDPPC in 1988 was 1.4 ppa.[13] So the total gain from the 1988 growth acceleration was (3.5-1.4)*22 = 46% – Uganda's output was 46% higher due to the 1988 growth acceleration than the counter-factual of 1.4 ppa growth.

$$g^{Predicted}_{1988\text{-}2010} = .0065 + .191 * g_{1980\text{-}1988} + 0.001 * ln(GDPPC_{1988})$$

11 There is some discrepancy between these growth rates and the numbers in Figure 6 because the growth rates in Figure 6 are the result of the output of the BP procedure, whereas the numbers in the table (and used in Figure 8) are OLS estimated growth rates.

12 The equation, with coefficients estimated from all countries except Uganda, is: $g^{Predicted}_{1969\text{-}1980}$. Hence plugging in the values of g1961-1969=.030 and ln(824)=6.71, produces $g^{Predicted}$=.023.

13 The equation for this episode is (the prediction equation is estimated for each episode):

$g^{Predicted}_{1988\text{-}2010} = .0065 + 91 * g_{1980\text{-}1988} + .001 * ln(GDPPC_{1988})$ And plugging in of $g_{1980\text{-}1988}$=-.005 and ln(529)=6.27, produces $g^{Predicted}$=.014.

Uganda

Figure 5: Single trend for Uganda



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Uganda



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Uganda



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Uganda



Section II: Country Graphs

Afghanistan

Figure 5: Single trend for Afghanistan



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Afghanistan



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Afghanistan



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Afghanistan



Albania

Figure 5: Single trend for Albania



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Albania



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Albania



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Albania



Algeria

Figure 5: Single trend for Algeria



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Algeria



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Algeria



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Algeria



Angola

Figure 5: Single trend for Angola



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Angola



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Angola



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Angola



Argentina

Figure 5: Single trend for Argentina



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Argentina



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Argentina



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Argentina



Australia

Figure 5: Single trend for Australia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Australia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Australia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Australia



Austria

Figure 5: Single trend for Austria



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Austria



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Austria



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Austria



Bangladesh

Figure 5: Single trend for Bangladesh



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Bangladesh



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Bangladesh



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Bangladesh



Belgium

Figure 5: Single trend for Belgium



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Belgium



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Belgium



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Belgium



Benin

Figure 5: Single trend for Benin



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Benin



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Benin



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Benin



Bolivia

Figure 5: Single trend for Bolivia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Bolivia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Bolivia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Bolivia



Botswana

Figure 5: Single trend for Botswana



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Botswana



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Botswana



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Botswana



Brazil

Figure 5: Single trend for Brazil



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Brazil



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Brazil



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Brazil



Bulgaria

Figure 5: Single trend for Bulgaria



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Bulgaria



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Bulgaria



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Bulgaria



Burkina Faso

Figure 5: Single trend for Burkina Faso



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Burkina Faso



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Burkina Faso



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Burkina Faso



Burundi

Figure 5: Single trend for Burundi



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Burundi



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Burundi



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Burundi



Cambodia

Figure 5: Single trend for Cambodia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Cambodia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Cambodia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Cambodia



Cameroon

Figure 5: Single trend for Cameroon



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Cameroon



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Cameroon



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Cameroon



Canada

Figure 5: Single trend for Canada



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Canada



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Canada



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Canada



Central African Republic

Figure 5: Single trend for Central African Republic



gure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Central African Rep



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Central African Republic



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Central African Repu



Chad

Figure 5: Single trend for Chad



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Chad



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Chad



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Chad



Chile

Figure 5: Single trend for Chile



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Chile



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Chile



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Chile



China

Figure 5: Single trend for China Version 1



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: China Version 1



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for China Version 1



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: China Version 1



Colombia

Figure 5: Single trend for Colombia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Colombia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Colombia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Colombia



Congo, Rep.

Figure 5: Single trend for Congo, Republic of



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Congo, Republic



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Congo, Republic of



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Congo, Republic



Congo, Dem Rep

Figure 5: Single trend for Congo, Dem. Rep.



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B−P breaks: Congo, Dem. Rep



Figure 7: Bai−Perron Identified Break(s) for Congo, Dem. Rep.



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Congo, Dem. Rep



Costa Rica

Figure 5: Single trend for Costa Rica



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Costa Rica



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Costa Rica



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Costa Rica



Côte d'Ivoire

Figure 5: Single trend for Cote d'Ivoire



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Cote d'Ivoire



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Cote d'Ivoire



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Cote d'Ivoire



Cuba

Figure 5: Single trend for Cuba



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Cuba



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Cuba



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Cuba



Cyprus

Figure 5: Single trend for Cyprus



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Cyprus



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Cyprus



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Cyprus



Denmark

Figure 5: Single trend for Denmark



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Denmark



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Denmark



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Denmark



Dominican Republic

Figure 5: Single trend for Dominican Republic



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Dominican Republ



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Dominican Republic



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Dominican Republ



Ecuador

Figure 5: Single trend for Ecuador



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Ecuador



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Ecuador



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Ecuador



Egypt, Arab Rep

Figure 5: Single trend for Egypt



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Egypt



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Egypt



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Egypt



El Salvador

Figure 5: Single trend for El Salvador



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: El Salvador



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for El Salvador



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: El Salvador



Ethiopia

Figure 5: Single trend for Ethiopia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Ethiopia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Ethiopia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Ethiopia



Fiji

Figure 5: Single trend for Fiji



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Fiji



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Fiji



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Fiji



Finland

Figure 5: Single trend for Finland



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Finland



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Finland



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Finland



France

Figure 5: Single trend for France



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: France



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for France



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: France



Gabon

Figure 5: Single trend for Gabon



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Gabon



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Gabon



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Gabon



Gambia, The

Figure 5: Single trend for Gambia, The



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B−P breaks: Gambia, The



Figure 7: Bai−Perron Identified Break(s) for Gambia, The



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Gambia, The



Germany

Figure 5: Single trend for Germany



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Germany



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Germany



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Germany



Ghana

Figure 5: Single trend for Ghana



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Ghana



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Ghana



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Ghana



Greece

Figure 5: Single trend for Greece



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Greece



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Greece



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Greece



Guatemala

Figure 5: Single trend for Guatemala



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Guatemala



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Guatemala



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Guatemala



Guinea

Figure 5: Single trend for Guinea



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B−P breaks: Guinea



Figure 7: Bai−Perron Identified Break(s) for Guinea



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Guinea



Guinea-Bissau

Figure 5: Single trend for Guinea-Bissau



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B-P breaks: Guinea-Bissau



Figure 7: Bai-Perron Identified Break(s) for Guinea-Bissau



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Guinea-Bissau



Guyana

Figure 5: Single trend for Guyana



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Guyana



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Guyana



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Guyana



Haiti

Figure 5: Single trend for Haiti



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Haiti



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Haiti



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Haiti



Honduras

Figure 5: Single trend for Honduras



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Honduras



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Honduras



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Honduras



Hong Kong SAR, China

Figure 5: Single trend for Hong Kong



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Hong Kong



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Hong Kong



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Hong Kong



Hungary

Figure 5: Single trend for Hungary



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Hungary



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Hungary



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Hungary



India

Figure 5: Single trend for India



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: India



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for India



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: India



Indonesia

Figure 5: Single trend for Indonesia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Indonesia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Indonesia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Indonesia



Iran, Islamic Rep.

Figure 5: Single trend for Iran



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Iran



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Iran



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Iran



Iraq

Figure 5: Single trend for Iraq



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B−P breaks: Iraq



Figure 7: Bai−Perron Identified Break(s) for Iraq



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Iraq



Ireland

Figure 5: Single trend for Ireland



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Ireland



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Ireland



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Ireland



Israel

Figure 5: Single trend for Israel



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Israel



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Israel



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Israel



Italy

Figure 5: Single trend for Italy



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Italy



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Italy



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Italy



Jamaica

Figure 5: Single trend for Jamaica



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Jamaica



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Jamaica



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Jamaica



Japan

Figure 5: Single trend for Japan



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Japan



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Japan



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Japan



Jordan

Figure 5: Single trend for Jordan



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Jordan



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Jordan



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Jordan



Kenya

Figure 5: Single trend for Kenya



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Kenya



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Kenya



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Kenya



Korea, Rep.

Figure 5: Single trend for Korea, Republic of



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Korea, Republic



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Korea, Republic of



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Korea, Republic



Lao PDR

Figure 5: Single trend for Laos



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Laos



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Laos



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Laos



Lebanon

Figure 5: Single trend for Lebanon



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Lebanon



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Lebanon



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Lebanon



Lesotho

Figure 5: Single trend for Lesotho



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Lesotho



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Lesotho



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Lesotho



Liberia

Figure 5: Single trend for Liberia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Liberia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Liberia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Liberia



Madagascar

Figure 5: Single trend for Madagascar



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Madagascar



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Madagascar



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Madagascar



Malawi

Figure 5: Single trend for Malawi



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Malawi



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Malawi



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Malawi



Malaysia

Figure 5: Single trend for Malaysia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Malaysia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Malaysia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Malaysia



Mali

Figure 5: Single trend for Mali



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Mali



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Mali



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Mali



Mauritania

Figure 5: Single trend for Mauritania



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Mauritania



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Mauritania



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Mauritania



Mauritius

Figure 5: Single trend for Mauritius



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Mauritius



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Mauritius



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Mauritius



Mexico

Figure 5: Single trend for Mexico



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Mexico



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Mexico



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Mexico



Mongolia

Figure 5: Single trend for Mongolia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Mongolia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Mongolia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Mongolia



Morocco

Figure 5: Single trend for Morocco



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Morocco



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Morocco



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Morocco



Mozambique

Figure 5: Single trend for Mozambique



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Mozambique



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Mozambique



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Mozambique



Namibia

Figure 5: Single trend for Namibia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Namibia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Namibia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Namibia



Nepal

Figure 5: Single trend for Nepal



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Nepal



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Nepal



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Nepal



Netherlands

Figure 5: Single trend for Netherlands



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Netherlands



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Netherlands



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Netherlands



New Zealand

Figure 5: Single trend for New Zealand



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: New Zealand



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for New Zealand



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: New Zealand



Nicaragua

Figure 5: Single trend for Nicaragua



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Nicaragua



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Nicaragua



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Nicaragua



Niger

Figure 5: Single trend for Niger



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Niger



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Niger



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Niger



Nigeria

Figure 5: Single trend for Nigeria



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Nigeria



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Nigeria



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Nigeria



Norway

Figure 5: Single trend for Norway



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Norway



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Norway



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Norway



Oman

Figure 5: Single trend for Oman



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Oman



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Oman



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Oman



Pakistan

Figure 5: Single trend for Pakistan



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Pakistan



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Pakistan



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Pakistan



Panama

Figure 5: Single trend for Panama



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Panama



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Panama



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Panama



Papua New Guinea

Figure 5: Single trend for Papua New Guinea



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Papua New Guin



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Papua New Guinea



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Papua New Guine



Paraguay

Figure 5: Single trend for Paraguay



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Paraguay



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Paraguay



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Paraguay



Peru

Figure 5: Single trend for Peru



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Peru



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Peru



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Peru



Philippines

Figure 5: Single trend for Philippines



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Philippines



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Philippines



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Philippines



Poland

Figure 5: Single trend for Poland



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Poland



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Poland



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Poland



Portugal

Figure 5: Single trend for Portugal



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Portugal



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Portugal



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Portugal



Puerto Rico

Figure 5: Single trend for Puerto Rico



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Puerto Rico



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Puerto Rico



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Puerto Rico



Romania

Figure 5: Single trend for Romania



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Romania



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Romania



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Romania



Rwanda

Figure 5: Single trend for Rwanda



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Rwanda



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Rwanda



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Rwanda



Senegal

Figure 5: Single trend for Senegal



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Senegal



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Senegal



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Senegal



Sierra Leone

Figure 5: Single trend for Sierra Leone



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Sierra Leone



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Sierra Leone



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Sierra Leone



Singapore

Figure 5: Single trend for Singapore



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Singapore



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Singapore



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Singapore



Somalia

Figure 5: Single trend for Somalia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B−P breaks: Somalia



Figure 7: Bai−Perron Identified Break(s) for Somalia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Somalia



South Africa

Figure 5: Single trend for South Africa



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: South Africa



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for South Africa



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: South Africa



Spain

Figure 5: Single trend for Spain



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Spain



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Spain



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Spain



Sri Lanka

Figure 5: Single trend for Sri Lanka



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Sri Lanka



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Sri Lanka



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Sri Lanka



Sudan

Figure 5: Single trend for Sudan



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Sudan



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Sudan



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Sudan



Swaziland

Figure 5: Single trend for Swaziland



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Swaziland



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Swaziland



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Swaziland



Sweden

Figure 5: Single trend for Sweden



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Sweden



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Sweden



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Sweden



Switzerland

Figure 5: Single trend for Switzerland



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Switzerland



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Switzerland



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Switzerland



Syrian Arab Republic

Figure 5: Single trend for Syria



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Syria



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Syria



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Syria



Taiwan

Figure 5: Single trend for Taiwan



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Taiwan



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Taiwan



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Taiwan



Tanzania

Figure 5: Single trend for Tanzania



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Tanzania



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Tanzania



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Tanzania



Thailand

Figure 5: Single trend for Thailand



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Thailand



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Thailand



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Thailand



Togo

Figure 5: Single trend for Togo



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B−P breaks: Togo



Figure 7: Bai−Perron Identified Break(s) for Togo



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Togo



Trinidad and Tobago

Figure 5: Single trend for Trinidad &Tobago



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Trinidad &Tobag



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Trinidad &Tobago



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Trinidad &Tobag



Tunisia

Figure 5: Single trend for Tunisia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Tunisia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Tunisia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Tunisia



Turkey

Figure 5: Single trend for Turkey



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Turkey



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Turkey



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Turkey



Uganda

Figure 5: Single trend for Uganda



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Uganda



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Uganda



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Uganda



United Kingdom

Figure 5: Single trend for United Kingdom



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: United Kingdom



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for United Kingdom



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: United Kingdom



United States

Figure 5: Single trend for United States



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: United States



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for United States



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: United States



Uruguay

Figure 5: Single trend for Uruguay



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Uruguay



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Uruguay



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Uruguay



Venezuela, RB

Figure 5: Single trend for Venezuela



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Venezuela



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Venezuela



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Venezuela



Vietnam

Figure 5: Single trend for Vietnam



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from two possible B–P breaks: Vietnam



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Vietnam



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Vietnam



Zambia

Figure 5: Single trend for Zambia



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from three possible B–P breaks: Zambia



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Zambia



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Zambia



Zimbabwe

Figure 5: Single trend for Zimbabwe



Figure 6: Breaks filtered from four possible B–P breaks: Zimbabwe



Figure 7: Bai–Perron Identified Break(s) for Zimbabwe



Figure 8: Cumulative change in LGDPPC from start to end of episode compared to regression prediction over episode period: Zimbabwe



Figure 9: Surface Plot of Transition Probability Function



Figure 10: Contour Plot of Transition Probability Function





Part IV

Conclusions

Part IV: Conclusions

All happy families are alike, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.

TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA

What would "growth theory" be a theory of? As we see graphically, in the "happy" families of the rich industrial countries the traditional decomposition of the evolution of output per capita into "trend" and "cycle" makes lots of sense. Their growth rates are moderate, volatility is low and growth transitions are within a small range (no busts, no huge booms). The distinction between a "growth theory" (and empirics) that explains "the" growth rate (in either "exogenous" or "endogenous" variants) and a theory (and empirics) that explains the "cyclical" variations around that trend (macroeconomics) again makes sense.

However, almost no developing countries' growth experiences fit that pattern. Our primary goal for this "visual handbook" is to make it easy for people to *look* at the country growth experiences.

Part II summarizes each country's growth experience in a series of *exactly comparable* graphs that illustrate the different dimensions of growth from the simplest overall trend (Figure 1) to relative long-run performance (Figure 2) to growth volatility (Figure 3) to distribution across "growth regimes" (Figure 4).

Part III also produces new comparable graphs focused on documenting the timing and magnitude of "breaks" or "episodes" or "regime transitions" from the application of the standard statistical procedure (Figure 6) to a classification of growth breaks based on the *magnitude* of growth shifts (Figure 7) to estimates of the *cumulative* magnitude of growth episodes (Figure 8).

Unlike most papers that propose and defend a particular causal model (or add a new variable to an existing model) or propose an explanation of some phenomenon, our goal is to illustrate that there is an interesting phenomenon to be explained. There is nothing about the *dynamics* of economic growth – the apparent shifts across growth regimes – that is well-explained by either "growth theory" or "business cycle macroeconomics" of the first or second generation varieties. But these *dynamics* are empirically important – indeed in some instances "staggering" in magnitude.

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Appendix 1: Methods to Identify Growth Breaks

The methodology used to identify growth breaks in the literature can be classified as either one of two distinct approaches, namely, the "filter-based" approach and the "statistical break test-based" approach. The "filter" approach identifies growth changes as "breaks" on the basis of statistical tests plus the *magnitude* of the change in growth before and after a break against a subjectively defined threshold (e.g. Hausmann *et al.*, 2005).[14] The "statistical" approach uses estimation and testing procedures that identify growth breaks in terms of statistically significant changes in (average) growth rates (e.g. Jones and Olken, 2008; Berg *et al.*, 2012; Kerekes, 2011).

All of the essential differences between "filter based" and "statistical" approaches come in the second stage of deciding which of the "candidate" break years identified by choosing years that maximize a test statistic (or, equivalently, minimizing the Sum of Squared Errors (SSE) under constraints) represents a "true" break.

The strongest criticism of the BP methodology is that it has low statistical power, leading to rejection of structural breaks even when they are "true" breaks. Moreover, since the statistical power of the test is dependent on the underlying volatility of the GDPPC series, the BP procedure may "reject" the null and identify as a "true" break a shift in growth rates with an acceleration from g=1 to g=3.5, Δg=2.5 in one country and "fail to reject" a break of the *exact same magnitude* in another country with higher volatility.

The literature has tried to deal with this problem in two ways. One set of papers (Jones and Olken, 2008; Kerekes, 2011) have accepted this shortcoming and stressed that although the set of breaks identified in their studies are a subset of the complete set of "true" breaks, the breaks that are identified are very large in magnitude and analysis of these breaks can throw light on growth transitions, even if others are excluded. Jones and Olken allow the minimum length of the growth regimes to vary depending on the length of the data available (which differs from country to country in the Penn World Tables). Kerekes (2011) fixes the shortest growth at eight years for all countries.

A second approach (Berg *et al.*, 2012) makes methodological changes to the BP tests in order to increase the power of these tests. One important outcome of the methodological differences in these studies is that, as contributions using a common framework, they fail to identify a largely common set of breaks, even for the historical data (Kar *et al.*, 2013). This clearly leads to serious concerns about the cohesiveness of the literature on growth breaks.

In Figure 6, for each country, we provide the year of the growth break if we

14 Hausmann *et al.* only calculate up breaks using a filter-break approach, and so is not strictly comparable with other studies, including ours, all of which use a statistical approach or a combination of a statistical plus filter approach.

only used BP to identify breaks in growth. Generally speaking, the timings of our breaks coincide with Berg *et al.* (2012). We find more breaks than Jones-Olken and Kerekes, both of which use a pure statistical approach. We also find more breaks with our "BP plus filter" approach as compared with using BP only, which, as we noted, with its low power, tends to accept the null hypothesis of no break more often than may be justified by the time-series data of GDPPC for several countries.